because not a final settlement of the rights of parties before the tribunal. It is true that notice to those known to be interested is provided for, but there is no power to summon them to appear. The findings are open to collateral attack but no appeal lies from them. The object of this notice, therefore, is to lessen the hardship of a short period of limitation. The reasoning of the court amounts to saying that an act becomes judicial in its character when it is made the starting point for a statute of limitations.

The counsel for the State in this case, Messrs. Pence and Carpenter of Chicago, have favored the REVIEW with copies of their very able briefs. They have attacked many features of the voluminous statute. It is possible here to mention only a few of the points they have made. They contend that, on a fair construction of the act, no statute of limitations is provided for, at any rate as to the decisions of registrars on the transfer of land which has been brought under the act; and that, if a statute of limitations is provided for, it is not constitutional, not being connected with possession on the part of the person in whose favor it runs. The view taken by the court rendered it unnecessary to consider these doubtful and interesting points. If the petition for a rehearing is granted, the court may pass upon some of them.

A PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE METHODS OF LAW REPORTING. — The task of extracting the law from the enormous mass of judicial decisions annually reported in this country is so difficult, that hardly a month elapses without the publication of some plan for simplifying the matter. And never were discussions of the question more pertinent than at present, in the light of the fact that this year's Century Digest of American Cases will, according to Professor C. G. Tiedeman of the University Law School of New York, contain reference to over half a million cases. Professor Tiedeman's article on "The Doctrine of Stare Decisis" in the recently published report of the New York Bar Association, contains an interesting suggestion on this point. He proposes that the reports of decisions should in the future contain only a statement of the material facts of the case, and a concise statement of the ruling of the court on the questions of law involved. And he suggests the appointment of a commission composed of the ablest jurists of the State, who should be charged with the reduction of the existing law to the form of commentaries on the different branches, and who should, after the completion of this task, issue annuals in which the judgments of the court during the current year would be analytically explained in the light of their exposition of the existing law, and the modifications stated, if any, which the new case has made in the prior law. These commentaries, he adds, should not take on the rigid form of a code, but should be in the strictest sense commentaries only, intended to relieve the profession of "the titanic task of gleaning the law from a study of five hundred thousand cases," and from "the difficult effort to reconcile the conflicting opinions of the courts in innumerable cases in which the judgments, upon a proper analysis of the law, and apart from judicial opinions, can be shown to be in harmony."

Professor Tiedeman's scheme seems to be, in effect, to restrict the judges to the task of simply deciding the rights of the litigants in the particular cases before them without giving their reasons, and to leave to the commission the truly "titanic" task of summarizing the results in the light of existing law. One may doubt the practicability of such a scheme,

but that its effect would be to simplify the task of the practising lawyer to an extraordinary degree must be plain to the most sceptical. Whether or not it is possible of realization, a step in the right direction could certainly be taken by the material shortening of judicial opinions. That this, at least, is not out of the question, seems clear. That it is desirable must be patent to any one who turns from a volume of English reports of the early part of this century to any recent volume of State reports.

"PICKETING" — INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STRIKERS. — Most of the public, outside of the trades unions, have a sufficient prejudice against anything that could be called "picketing" to approve without hesitation the sweeping injunction issued by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the recent case of *Vegelahn* v. *Gunter*, 44 N. E. Rep. 1077. And at the first reading the majority opinion seems to show sufficient grounds for the injunction. The more carefully, however, the dissenting opinions, especially that of Mr. Justice Holmes, are studied, the more doubtful the question becomes. The case was one of a now common sort, where workmen on strike maintain a patrol in front of the resisting employer's premises, with the object of intercepting other workmen who may come to take employment with him, and dissuading them from so doing. In this instance the patrol consisted of only two men, and if they were using any threats of violence, or inducing any breaches of existing contracts, such plainly illegal conduct was already under the injunction of the court. The question then before the Supreme Court was whether every sort of "picketing," and all attempts by the strikers to prevent men going into the plaintiff's employ, however peaceable the means used, should be enjoined as an unjustifiable infliction of damage to the plaintiff's business. The whole question turns, of course, on whether the infliction of the damage was justifiable. The majority of the court, without clearly separating the mere peaceable persuasion used by the defendants upon the other workmen from the intimidation supposed to be practised, held that the defendants' acts were not justified by their ultimate motive, that of securing better wages. They do not, however, distinguish clearly the cases where rivalry of interests in trade has been held to justify the intentional infliction of serious damage to business. Why the acts of the defendants in cases like *Mogul Steamship Co.* v. *McGregor*, [1892] A. C. 25, are within allowable competition, and the acts of the defendants in this case are not, is not made to appear very distinctly.

The truth is, as Mr. Justice Holmes points out in his opinion, and as he had before urged in an article in 8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1, covering the very ground of this case, that the question of what sort of competition is allowable, or will furnish a justification for the intentional infliction of damage to business, is a mere question of public policy, which the most thorough knowledge of the law helps judges but little to decide. Nothing could be more apposite to this case than the following portions of the article just referred to: "The ground of decision really comes down to a proposition of policy of rather a delicate nature concerning the merit of a particular benefit to themselves intended by the defendants, and suggests a doubt whether judges with different economic sympathies might not decide such a case differently when brought face to face with the issue." As to which side the economic sympathies of the judges ought to incline towards, when they find such questions presented